Capitalism and the media: moral economy, well-being and capabilities by Hesmondhalgh, D
	



	
				
	

	
	
	

	
				
 !

∀#
∃%&∋()∗+,−	#	##


#.%/0∃
0	1%−	2
	.3224)∗+ / 5
		6

∃∗)∗∗55)∗+  5∗++ ∗ 
7()∗+%8	
	



	
0	

1%−	2
	.

		09/∃

.

		
			
	:	

				

Capitalism and the Media: Moral Economy, Well-Being and Capabilities 
David Hesmondhalgh 
Version of article accepted for publication, January 2016, by Media, Culture and Society 
This version has still to be copy-edited and proof-read for final publication, and may still 
contain typos. Some references may be missing. 
Abstract 
This article aims to contribute to the renewal of consideration of media and culture 
under capitalism, by seeking solid normative foundations for critique via various 
compatible elements: moral economy, well-being understood as flourishing, Sen and ǯ, and the value of culture. Insufficient attention has 
been paid to normative and conceptual issues concerning capitalism, media and culture. 
Moral economy approaches might help fill this gap by valuably providing a richly critical 
ethics-based approach to economy and society, compatible with the best political 
economy. Two further concepts, compatible with moral economy, can reinvigorate and 
renew critique of capitalism, media and culture. The first is a particular (Aristotelian) 
conception of well-being, understood as flourishing. This is outlined, and its potential 
contribution to critique of media and culture under capitalism is explicated. The second 
is capabilities, which can provide a basis for dealing with different understandings of 
flourishing. The article outlines the capabilities approach, analyses rare applications of 
it to media and culture, and explains how these applications might be built upon, by 
developing ǯs work in a way that could ground critique in an understanding of ǯǤ 
Keywords: capitalism and media, moral economy, capabilities, well-being, flourishing, 
value of culture, ethical turn, Nussbaum 
 
Article 
Not so long ago, capitalism was a concept largely ignored in public discourse and social 
science, other than by Marxists. Things have changed since the turn of the century. 
Faced with the prospect of devastating climate change, growing inequality and the 
2 
 
devotion of vast resources to goods and services that do not seem to answer to 
meaningful human needs, capitalism itself has come under scrutiny. Academics, 
journalists, and even the Pope have weighed in. Some accounts have achieved a 
remarkable degree of attention, acclaim and sales (such as Piketty, 2014). As a result, 
debates about capitalism are perhaps now more diverse, contested and confusing than 
ever. The plethora of commentary seems not to have significantly restrained the pursuit 
of unbridled capitalism. But there is now widespread acceptance that capitalism is a 
meaningful way to describe a vital systemic aspect of the world in which we live, and a 
growing appreciation that a fuller critical understanding of this mysterious entity might 
be helpful for humanity.  
It is not clear however that there has been a similar growth in attention to 
capitalism in recent debates about culture and about the communication media. This is 
in spite of the fact that developments in these realms seem to confirm a sense of ǯ, and in some respects are at the core of recent changes in 
capitalism. In particular, the rise of the internet and mobile communication emerged 
from a new and evolving type of capitalist activity, centred on Silicon Valley, which 
presented itself as benign, and was accepted as such by many commentators. The social 
media produced by Silicon Valley have further fuelled the continuing growth of 
promotional communicationǡǮ-ǯǡ
insertion of competitive behaviour into ǯself-realisation. In media and 
cultural policy, the view that very lightly regulated markets are the most efficient and 
ethical way to allocate resources and co-ordinate economic activity has gained ground 
to a remarkable degree. It has been manifested in attacks on public service media, and 
in culturaǯ fostering of Ǯcreative industriesǯ, in the interests of economic growth, 
rather than for their contribution to well-being, or other non-economic goals.   
Of course, there have been many valuable treatments of the above developments, 
and other related ones too (more on this below). But rather few of them draw explicitly 
and/or substantially on theories of capitalism to conceptualise their analyses. Fewer 
still, I shall argue below, have linked a serious effort to understand capitalism with 
explicit sustained discussion of how evaluations of it might be grounded. No doubt this 
lack partly derives from genuine difficulties. There are many plausible competing 
understandings of capitalism. And how does one assess something that, in some 
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conceptions, seems to be everywhere and everythingȂ and therefore nowhere and 
nothing in particular? ȋǮǯǡ
no means solves the problem). These combined difficulties have made it hard for critics 
of capitalism-media-culture relations to construct reasoned critiques that can transcend 
divisions on the left, and carry weight beyond it.  
This article does not purport to fill this gap by itself Ȃ no single article could - but 
it does aim to contribute to the renewal of consideration of media and communication 
under capitalism, by seeking solid normative foundations for critique. Rather than go Ǯǯȋǡnot performed in a doctrinal way, can undoubtedly be 
helpful), it follows a different route, by drawing on recent ethically-informed thinking 
about capitalism and economic life, and on related political theories concerning justice. 
It therefore builds on recent efforts to integrate philosophical and social-theoretical 
thinking about ethics and values into the study of media, communication and culture 
(Couldry, 2012; Couldry et al., 2013; Rao and Wasserman, 2015) beyond sometimes 
conceptually Ǯ ǯǤHowever, tǮǯ
in the field has paid little attention to capitalism itself, and indeed has neglected 
political-economic processes and concepts such as markets. It has even had little to say 
about how we might understand class, gender and ethnicity and other phenomena in 
relation to capitalism. So the approach here strives for greater synthesis of political 
economy, cultural studies, social theory and ethics, by drawing upon variants of critical 
social science known as moral economy.  
A discussion of how capitalism might be defined will help to clarify the place of Ǯǯǡ
how this article must necessarily delimit the otherwise foolhardy enterprise of 
addressing capitalism-media relations as a whole. Cogent definitions of capitalism often 
centre on two main features: class relations defined by private ownership and property-
less workers, and economic coordination organized mainly through decentralized 
market exchange (Wright, 2010: 34-5). Together, Erik Olin Wright notes, these two 
features generate the characteristic competitive drive for profit and capital 
accumulation that produces a striking dynamism relative to all earlier forms of 
economic organization. However, many students of capitalism now acknowledge the 
need to understand capitalism in broad terms, recognising the importance of the 
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economic, but not confining analysis of capitalism to this level. One way to do this is 
simply to recognise, as Wright (2010: 35) ǡǮǯproperty, markets 
and so on. It is possible to develop a non-functionalist understanding of such Ǯǯsm, as Nancy Fraser (2014) does in a recent article, 
and media and culture could fruitfully be understood as one such set of institutional 
arrangements, but I cannot pursue that line of enquiry here. Rather, I want to make two 
simple clarifications on the ǯǤ
discussion of political economy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for analysis of 
capitalism, and I will return at the end of this article to how the moral economy of media 
approach advocated here needs to be conjoined with other ways of understanding 
communication. The second is that, for reasons of space, I focus here on the issue of 
markets, and hope to address class (understood intersectionally in relation to other 
aspects of social identity under capitalism) in later work. More specifically, my 
approach in this article is to suggest ways in which the effects of (proliferating and 
extending) markets on media and culture might be evaluated, drawing on the ethically-
inflected moral economy perspectives mentioned above. This approach concentrates on 
ǯ contribute to human well-being 
or quality of life, Ǯ-beinǯdefined in a specific way that I will explain in due 
course. Next, though, I need briefly to contextualise my approach with reference to 
existing approaches to capitalism-media-culture relations, and to expand on my earlier 
assertions about the neglect of the concept of capitalism in recent media and cultural 
studies. 
  
Approaches to capitalism, media and culture 
For many years, critiques of media and culture in relation to the concept of 
capitalism were mainly to be found in two categories of writing, broadly understood. 
One was critical political economy of culture, or media (PEM for short), part of the 
discipline or field now known as media, communication and cultural studies (or some 
variation on that term). Developing out of sociology and politics departments, PEM 
produced numerous important empirically-based critiques of ways in which media 
were entangled with state and business power in capitalist societies. In some of the 
most cited texts, however, the concept of capitalism is almost entirely absent (e.g., 
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Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Elsewhere capitalism is mentioned frequently, but there 
is little explicit conceptualisation of capitalism itself or of what the fundamental 
objections to it might be (e.g., McChesney, 2008; Zhao, 2008). That is not in itself a 
major criticism of any individual works. But theoretical synthesis attempting normative 
or explanatory underpinning for ǯ was rare 
(Garnham, 1990; Mosco, 1996 were among the exceptions), and has become rarer with 
the years.1  Perhaps as a result of this general lack of theoretical and normative 
ambition, PEM has failed to have much impact on developments in other areas of social 
theory or cultural theory.  
Meanwhile, other areas of media and communication studies influenced more by 
once-fashionable post-structuralism and cultural studies, have shown little interest in 
the concept of capitalism, or in political-economic analysis. There, analysis of capitalism 
was often felt to be tainted by the supposed economic determinism and/or Communist 
doctrinalism of previous Marxian approaches, and the main writers eventually left 
behind even neo-Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci and Althusser who were considered 
unblemished ǮǯǤǮ-economy ǯǡnly outliers such as Gibson-Graham (1996) attempted sustained analysis 
of the concept of capitalism from a post-structuralist perspective on economic thought. 
Although the theoretical wing of cultural studies later showed interest in autonomist 
Marxism, and in new French-theory icons such as Rancière, capitalism has generally 
been of little interest to cultural studies. The new wave of writing and thinking about 
capitalism of the last ten years in public discourse and social science has mostly left 
media, communication and cultural studies untouched. 
A second major source of thinking about media and culture in relation to 
capitalism derived from what might broadly be called critical theory. This tradition 
began in earnest with the work of writers such as Lukacs and Adorno, who brought 
together concepts from Marx (who had made only passing comments on culture and 
communication in his work) with Hegelian and other forms of European philosophy. 
Adorno remains a towering figure in conceptualisations of capitalism, media and 
culture, but he has very little interest in capitalism as a political-economic system, and 
inheritors of his tradition often resort to cant in their dismissals of contemporary 
culture. The most distinguished living exponents of critical theory in this tradition, 
Slavoj ~ā and Fredric Jameson, fruitfully draw on theories of subjectivity influenced 
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by psychoanalysis to explore the cultural contradictions of the capitalist system. But 
they have almost nothing to say about what are widely regarded as two fundamental 
features of capitalism itself Ȃ markets and class-property relations. ǯǡthe 
critical theory tradition tends to shun explicit engagement with normative debate about 
economic concepts generally. There may be much invocation of the concept of the 
commodity, or commodification, but not much clarification of what the problem is. The ǯ
(such as Dyer-Witheford, 1999 ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯegarding Ǯǯ). Partly as a result, critical theory of media and culture under 
capitalism has suffered from normative under-development.2  
My claim then is that even though there has been some attention to capitalism-
media-culture relations, in media and cultural studies there has been a lack of serious 
theoretical interest in key concepts and processes (notably markets and class), and in 
difficult normative questions regarding capitalism. How then might moral economy help 
address those lacks and contribute to a regeneration of critique, on different terms? 
First of all, what is moral economy? 
 
The concept of moral economy 
The concept of moral economy refers to the way in which all economies are suffused 
with values and beliefs about what constitutes proper activity, regarding rights and 
responsibilities of individuals and institutions, and qualities of goods, service and 
environment (Sayer, 1999: 68). All economies, then, in this sense, are moral economies. 
A moral economy approach takes this idea seriously, by considering the moral values 
informing particular economic arrangements and institutions, and providing reasoned 
evaluation of them. Fundamentally, this is a matter of introducing ethical thought into 
the study of economic life.  One advantage of this tradition is that it takes seriously the 
problem of normativity or making judgements (as opposed to stating facts or providing 
explanations) in the realm of economic life.  Moral economy has tended to thrive most 
among historians, anthropologists, philosophers and social theorists, rather than among 
economists, but it has the further strength of taking concepts such as markets seriously 
by drawing on a much wider range of disciplines and fields than the prevailing ways of 
understanding capitalism, media and culture discussed above.  
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The approach emerged in the late twentieth century. In 1994, political scientist 
William Booth (1994) provided an overview of Ǯǯ
flourished mainly among anthropologists, economic historians and classicists over the 
previous half century, including a number of writers who did not use the concept of 
moral economy at all, or only in a passing way, foǡǯ(1957/1944) 
account of how Ǯǯ
economic life from social relations, as a new self-regulating market society became 
dominant. Booth praised moral economy for its efforts to embed studies of economies in ǮǯǮǥǯȋ1994: 663). But Booth criticised 
the tendency of Polanyi and other moral economy writers to portray pre-modern 
societies in romantic terms, neglecting the hierarchical social relations sustained by 
non-market forms, and understating the degree to which modern market societies were 
themselves Ǯǯǡ
formal (though often not substantive) equality.3  
More recent moral economy work has avoided some of the pitfalls identified by 
Booth. In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, there has been a welcome revival of 
interest in ethical dimensions of economic life, especially the ethical implications of the ǮǯǤ
this work has crossed the boundaries between academic research and popular 
publishing (e.g. Sandel, 2013; Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012). But the most developed 
accounts of the potential contribution of moral economy to social-science 
understandings of economic life, including capitalism as a system, have been provided 
by Andrew Sayer in a series of articles and book chapters that build on his earlier 
sympathetic critique of radical political economy from a critical realist position (Sayer, 
1995). Here I draw on writings by Sayer (1999, 2000, 2003, 2007) to make three key 
points about moral economy approaches.  
First, as already indicated, moral economy approaches are strongly normative Ȃ 
they seek not only to identify moral principles but to make informed judgements about 
what is good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust, exploitative and non-
exploitative etc. in the realm of economic lifeǤǡǯǡ
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economy approaches are part of a broader set of critical social science approaches that 
provide alternatives to the subjectivism and amoralism of much conventional economic 
and sociological thought, and to the relativism and crypto-normativity of some post-
structuralist and postmodernist perspectives.  This emphasis on the normative does not 
mean that moral economy can or should ignore explanation or empirical detail. But 
there is an emphasis on paying careful attention to evaluation and its grounding.  
Second, a moral economy approach can be seen as a contribution to political 
economy, rather than as an attempt to supersede it. Moral economy can serve to 
develop a more adequate and nuanced political economy by exploring normative 
questions that are often repressed or hurried over. Political economists as different as 
Adam Smith and Marx were concerned with ethical values (though Marx was scathing 
about attempts to displace politics by dubious invocations of morality). However, 
modern political economy approaches, in general and in the realm of media and culture, 
may have followed liberal economics in understating, or at least failing to consider 
adequately, the way that moral values underpin economic action.  
Third, a moral economy approach should not imply a lack of attention to power. 
Sometimes, invocations of Ǯǯ to downplay considerations of power and 
politics. But there is no reason why moral economy approaches should not incorporate 
analysis of questions such as exploitation, inequality and domination where 
appropriate. Moral economy needs to be connected to the more general project of 
critical social science (Sayer, 2000) and to struggles for emancipation and justice. A 
failure to address power and domination would seriously weaken the enterprise. On the 
other hand, the focus on normative grounding may encourage nuance, complexity and 
ambivalence. Some Ǯǯ
more careful to register the ambivalence and complexity of the development of 
economic forms such as markets than are many Ǯradicalǯ political economists. To give 
just one example, Sayer (1999) discusses the way in which the de-traditionalisation 
brought about by capitalist modernity (including markets) changes social relations so 
that how to behave is no longer strictly dictated by custom. He suggests that this can be 
read in different ways and either (or both) positively and negatively Ȃ as a new freedom, 
or as a new atomism that breaks down community and sociality. It is important to hold 
on to such normative ambivalence, while retaining a critique of illegitimate and 
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pernicious forms of power and inequality, when considering contemporary capitalism-
media-culture relations.  
Moral economy has much to offer media and culture, but it has mostly neglected 
these domains (I will come to the most significant exception -Keat 2000 -  later). Sayer 
himself has intervened in social-theory debates about relations between culture and 
economy (see Sayer, 1999). However, this concerns culture in the sense of shared 
understandings, practices, values and beliefs, rather than culture defined in the more 
restricted sense of knowledge and aesthetic-artistic experience which is how the term 
tends to be used and understood in media, communication and cultural studies. A 
similar problem (in terms of my interests here) regarding the breadth of definition of 
culture surrounds the idea of cultural political economy, which has overlaps with some 
moral economy research. Cultural political economy (CPE) is a term that has been used 
to refer to social science that takes seriously the importance of the Ǯculturǯ
of economic life, such as the social relationships that sustain economic activity, and the 
interactions between meaning and practice (Sayer, 2001; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 
2008). Moral economy has a close affinity with CPE, where relations of power and 
domination are made central to analysis of economy/culture relations, but again in the Ǯǯ. Conversely, within media, communication and cultural studies, Ǯǯonly been sporadically employed (e.g., Jenkins, 1992; 
Green and Jenkins, 2009). And it has certainly not been well understood in that 
discipline or field, with some valuable exceptions (Banks, 2006; Murdock, 2011).  
Having (re)introduced the concept of moral economy, characterising it in general 
terms, I now want, as I indicated earlier, to focus on two broadly moral-economic 
concepts that might help to invigorate and renew explanation and evaluation of 
capitalism-media-culture relations. One (a particular conception of well-being) is 
addressed explicitly in moral economy writing and in related, more overtly Marxian 
thinking; the other (capabilities), is associated with the work of writers who are in 
many respects compatible with a moral economy approach, even if they do not use that 
term. 
Well-being, quality of life, flourishing 
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A concept of well-being seems an important element of any assessment of capitalism, or 
indeed any other set of social arrangements, at least when considered in terms of social 
justice, because it forefronts the fundamental issue of ǯ of the world. 
However, well-being is often interpreted and used in dubious ways, as Davies (2015) 
has recently illuminated (though he fails to offer a positive conception of it). We need a 
conception of well-being that can be distinguished from mistaken conceptions that 
would undermine critiques of social injustice, including neo-liberal, relativist and 
nihilist ones. To address just the first of these, defenders of capitalism often assert (or 
just assume) the superiority of markets over other ways of co-ordinating economic 
activities in complex societies on the grounds that it is the system which, on balance, 
most effectively advances well-being. That assertion is often strongly linked to two 
other key claims for the superiority of markets:  that they a) are supposedly neutral 
between different conceptions of the good, and therefore the best way to address 
otherwise insuperable issues of knowledge and value-incommensurability, and b) are 
based on principles of liberty and autonomy, and in turn help to promote liberty and ȋǯ, 1998: 64). Neo-liberal market advocates claim that markets provide 
the neutrality required by the pluralism of modern societies. Some, such as the Ǯǯǡǡ
argue that pluralism requires amoral and arational mechanisms. According to this view, 
politics should be restricted to setting the framework for the market, rather than setting 
any particular notion of the good. Neo-classical economics allows more room than 
theoretical neo-liberalism for intervention by the state in order to ensure that 
preferences are met. But, according to the neo-ǡǯ
preferences should interfere with efficiency Ȃ a market-led notion of politics that places 
them close to neo-liberalismǯ.  
A vital contribution that moral economy can make to discussion of such 
problems concerning value pluralism in modern societies derives from its rejection of 
such neutrality-based conceptions of well-being, and its insistence that economic and 
cultural decisions should be made on the basis of ethical decisions about what 
constitutes the good life. Market liberals (and also some on the left influenced by 
postmodernism) would claim that such a view is insufficiently pluralistic, in that it does 
not sufficiently recognise the vast range of human values and beliefs. But this is based 
11 
 
on a mistaken and relativist notion of plurality (or difference) that moral economists, 
often influenced by Aristotelian thought, would reject, as meaning that no belief about 
values is superior to any other. As moral economy writer John ǯ(1998) points out 
in his important book, The Market, modern Ǯwelfaristǯ arguments for markets based on 
their contribution to well-being tend to be empty of content, based on formal notions of 
well-being defined as the satisfaction of preferences, rather than substantive ones 
which would specify the content of well-being. This shift from substantive to formal 
conceptions of well-being is roǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?Ȍǡ
economic thought towards dubious subjectivist conceptions of well-ǡǮǯ-being is determined by their desires or beliefs about what is ǯ- as opposed to the obviously correct and uncontroversial subjectivist 
point that the content of well-being changes from person to person.  
An alternative to the utilitarian, preference-satisfaction conception of well-being 
or welfare used by many economists and other defenders of capitalism is needed, and 
we also need to reject any equation of well-ǮǯǤ
other modes of critical thinking underpinned by Aristotelian traditions, including ǯ-being, advocate instead a concept of eudemonia or 
flourishing. Ǯ-beingǯǮǡǯȋ, 2010: 13).4 
Moral economy and related Aristotelian political theory, rooted in conceptions of 
well-being as flourishing, can contribute to critique of media and communication in 
contemporary capitalism in a number of ways. First, they can productively focus 
attention on the failure of capitalist media and culture to enhance flourishing, thus 
providing a deeper, richer normative foundation for critiques emanating from political 
economy, critical theory and cultural studies. Sources from outside the moral economy 
and Aristotelian traditions indicate this fundamental problem of well-being in modern 
capitalist societies such as ǯThe Market Experience (1991) but also the more Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?). The latter uses a utilitarian notion of well-
being at odds with the Aristotelian position underpinning moral economy, but even this 
utilitarian approach at least opens up the question of the systematic failure of modern 
capitalist markets in terms of well-being. One reason for prevalent social dis-
satisfaction Ǯǯis that many of the goods people seek through 
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markets are positional goods. ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?Ȍgives the examples of luxury holidays 
and educational qualifications Ǯǯ 
rather than as means to knowledge. The problem with positional goods is that the 
implied promise to each individual that a good will make them better off is not realised 
if everyone has it or even if many people have it.  
There is a direct link to cultural and media goods here. Cultural consumption in 
capitalism is very often positional. ǯDistinction (1984) is the most famous 
analysis of the competitiveness involved in cultural goods. Even if Bourdieu excludes 
other more positive dimensions of cultural consumption (Miller, 2012 offers a more 
balanced and superior account in this regard) he usefully draws attention to how much 
contemporary culture is associated with status competition. Cultural goods in modern 
markets seem to be deeply connected to modern processes of self-identity and 
possessive individualism (see Honneth, 2004). ǯǡǡ
qualities associated with them that we will now discuss, derived from their particular 
and distinctive ability to disseminate meanings about other goods, might at times have a 
tendency to encourage the consumption of positional goods in general, such as luxury 
goods and holidays, not just media positional goods. In this respect, moral economy 
accounts that focus on flourishing in relation to the particular characteristics of media 
and cultural products produced and consumed under market relations more firmly 
ground critique than vague condemnation of (cultural) consumption per se. Its 
conception of well-being makes clear that the satisfaction of desires through the market, 
celebrated by defenders of capitalism, only leads to greater happiness or flourishing if 
those desires are good ones. It is important to understand that this notion of well-being 
is objectivist rather than subjectivist. As Sayer (2011: 134-139) explains, our subjective 
assessments of our well-being are deeply fallible and so flourishing is better thought of Ǯǡǯ
(p. 134). As Sayer emphasises, it is vital to realise that this objectivist conception of 
well-Ǯǯȋp. 135). We should 
take a pluralist, but not relativist, view that there are many kinds of well-ǡǮ
just any way of life constitutes well-ǯǤǯ
point of view Ȃ and social science can help develop ways of thinking about what might 
be good in a more objective way. 
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A second potentially fruitful contribution of moral economy and related 
Aristotelian theory is to draw attention to positive possibilities of media and cultural 
goods for the flourishing of individuals, communities and societies. While moral 
economyǯ provides a more cogent and meaningful conception of well-being 
than is provided by the advocates of capitalist markets, and therefore helps us to see 
that real well-being is not necessarily, or not truly, advanced by the expanded remit of 
markets in the realm of culture and media, it needs to be recognised that some market 
advocates take a more sophisticated subjectivist approach to well-being, defining it in 
terms of what we would value if we were fully informed about the merits of particular 
products ȋǯNeill. 1998). This more developed subjectivist approach is not so 
incompatible with the objectivist view of well-being held by moral economists, and also 
by Ǥǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?Ȍǡ
more sophisticǮ-being 
come through public deliberation and education of our preferences, not simply by ǯǤcapitalism-media-
culture relations becomes glaringly obvious at this juncture (ǯǯ
moral economy of markets does not find space to do so). For cultural and media 
products are surely vital ways in which people deliberate, and are exposed to 
deliberation over, the nature of products, and about whether they meaningfully enhance ǯ. In this respect, as the moral economy philosopher Russell Keat (2000) 
has pointed out, cultural and media products can be understood as meta-goods: goods Ǯǯgoods and that can serve to develop ǯ to 
make judgments about the nature and possibility of well-being. Education too is another 
vital enabler of such meta-discourse, but in fact education often carries out this function 
in relation to what might be more conventionally defined as media and cultural goods, 
such as through the teaching of literature, or history, where students are encouraged to 
consider books and other texts. This moral economy conception of meta-goods then is a 
helpful way to ground discussion of the value of culture and media, providing a more 
rigorous grounding in ethics and moral philosophy that might strengthen defences of 
public service broadcasting and arts subsidy.  
A third potential contribution of the approach advocated here is that this in turn 
raises the question of how effectively capitalist societies tend to produce and consume 
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such products. Keat argues that cultural goods, with their potential and actual benefits 
for well-being, are likely to be under-produced in market economies. This is because ǮǯǮǯǣǮ
consists, at least in part, in providing the means by which an existing set of preferences 
and desires may be transformed, through critical reflection, into more considered ones, 
rather than in directly satisfying those preferences, which is the characteristic of goods ǲǳǯ (Keat, 2000: 157).  Precisely because of this, such goods are 
likely to be under-produced in capitalist systems, dominated as they are by market 
exchange. Keat provides an account that suggests the limits of markets in the realm of 
media and culture, without dismissing the potential benefits of markets in certain 
circumstances, or the genuine concerns of market defenders.  ǯarguments also indicate a fourth potential value of the conceptualisation 
of well-being as flourishing I am advocating, and this relates more directly to policy. 
This is that the moral economy account above provides a potential basis for justifying 
non-market or less marketised provision, such as public service broadcasting, in order 
to enhance flourishing. ǯ
debates in cultural policy about cultural value (see, for example, Warwick Commission, 
2015). ǯǡoral economy suggests how the potential contribution of the 
production and consumption of cultural goods to well-being might ground the quest for 
a conception of the value of culture that might combat economic and other forms of Ǯǯǡwhere that value is understood in terms not of well-
being, but in terms of contribution to economic growth, or social goals such as crime 
reduction.  
Capabilities 
The discussion so far has not yet adequately considered the issue of how to 
ground a conception of well-being as flourishing, when faced with the great variety of 
people, communities and societies on our planet, in a way that avoid dubious 
universalisms. One important attempt to elaborate such a grounding has been provided 
by the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, in his Ǯǯ. Ǯǯǡ
economic issues makes him a kindred spirit to those who explicitly invoke the concept. 
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For Sen, what people are able to do is more important than states of mind in assessing 
the good life, and flourishing. For this reason, Sen drew on the concept of Ǯǯ(a 
translation of the Greek dunamin), the ability of people to do certain things, should they 
choose to (Sen, 1999: 18). The goal of economic development Ȃ a principal concern of ǯ- should be to enable such functionings.  
As with moral economy, media and culture have only very rarely figured in the 
capabilities approach to ethics, markets and economic lifeǤǯ
work with Drèze on how a free press helps to limit the consequences of famine, but Sen °ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍnfines its insights to the benefits of a formally free press, 
paying no attention to how markets limit substantive media freedoms for many 
potential producers. Sen shows no interest at all in any political economy of the media 
themselves.  
 Conversely, some media and cultural analysts ǯ
ideas Ȃ but with important limitations. Nick Couldry uses Senǯcapabilities approach as 
part of his outstanding efforts to develop a philosophically and sociologically informed 
conception of media justiceǤǯ well-argued preference for an Ǯǯǡ
concrete practices, to what people actually do (and need), rather than excessively 
abstract conceptions of good and bad. Couldry (2010: 105) proposes that we need to go ǯtreating voice Ȃ ǯȂ as a fundamental capability.  But 
Couldry does not attempt to address the political economy of media neglected by Sen 
and, as with the rest of his otherwise remarkably deep and wide oeuvre, Couldry does 
not confront the question of the relationships between markets and media production 
and distribution (Couldry, 2012: 185) but instead treats them as tangential to his main 
concerns. But this approach undermines the explanatory work that is needed to 
complement any normative approach to ethics and injustice. For economic 
arrangements Ȃ most notably, the nature of media markets under capitalism - are vital 
to understanding how the media take the form they do, and any effort to argue for 
change needs to confront how cultural-economic arrangements might be made better.  
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An earlier treatment by Nicholas Garnham is helpful in this respect, and also in 
that it more clearly (though schematically) lays out a set of relevant research 
programmes linked to the capabilities approach. For Garnham (1997) the most valuable ǯto understanding media and 
communication was that it could allow policy debate in these fields to transcend the 
poor normative framing that plagued it. Garnham observed that crude measures of 
access and usage (in media policy) or visits (in cultural/arts policy) do not get at ǯactual ability to make use of resources. By contrast, judgements informed by the 
capabilities approach would consider how well or badly media and communication, as 
they currently exist, serve ǯfunctionings. From the supply side, that 
would allow us to look at the degree to which media systems provide content that might 
contribute to functionings that people have reason to value, such as democratic 
participation in decisions about communities and societies, or physical health. In turn, 
Garnham pointed out, this might (or might not) lead us to advocate a greater role for 
public service media in order to limit some of the ways in which a marketised 
broadcasting system, based on the support of advertisers, might operate.  
It needs to be emphasised ǯȋ
ǯȌ
avoids the paternalism that both left and conservative-libertarian critics would rightly ǡǯactices, 
but because it is based on the kinds of objectivist notions of flourishing and the good life 
outlined above, it rejects the cop-out that services should be provided on the basis of 
what people say they enjoy, or what they purchase in the market. From the Ǯǯperspective of users, the capabilities approach would allow debate about 
constraints on what users do with the opportunities presented to them, and what might 
stop them from using media and communication resources to achieve functionings that ǤǮǯǣǯǡ
will affect their ability to purchase expensive items. But they can and must also be 
understood in social and cultural terms too, by considering how distinctive forms of ǯ
ability to make use of opportunities.  
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ǯpt the capabilities approach for analysing media has 
barely been taken up in media and communication studies (though see Mansell, 2002). 
The capabilities approach is under-developed in media and communications, as is the 
concept of well-being as flourishing that it seeks to ground. Sen perhaps might have 
helped matters by being rather clearer about what, in his opinion, the most relevant 
capabilities were. So a possible way forward for more adequate development of the 
capabilities approach for the media is to turn to the other chief exponent of the 
approach, the feminist philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, who ǯ
contributions by specifying ten sets of human capabilities she thought were generally 
necessary for well-being and a life lived with dignity (Nussbaum, 2006: 76-77). That list 
includes fundamental capabilities such as not dying prematurely, having good health 
and shelter, bodily integrity (including security against violent assault), and control ǯ. Needless to say, a flourishing cultural or 
media life is greatly inhibited in situations where people are deprived of such Ǥǯthe 
potential value of culture and media in modern societies. Briefly (for more details, see 
Nussbaum, 2006), these include: 
x ǡǡǯ
fear and anxiety.  
x Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason in a way informed by 
and cultivated by an adequate education. 
x Being able to laugh, play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
x Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for 
other human beings, to engage in various forms of interaction.5 ǯmedia 
and communication capabilities in wider terms than the information and knowledge on 
which Garnham and Couldry focus. In other work, including her defences of what 
AmericanǮǯǡNussbaum (1997, 2001) suggested how 
access to a rich set of artistic-aesthetic experiences might help people to understand 
and enhance vital emotional, imaginative and cognitive capabilities. As with Keatǯ 
moral-economic approach, discussed above (Keat, 2000), this is fundamentally a matter 
of the value of cultureǡǯǡ
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linked to her capabilities approach, provides a deeper basis for grounding a moral 
economy ǯconception of the value of media and culture, in terms of their 
ability to contribute to flourishing.  
However, Ǥǯapproach to cultural flourishing is 
potentially rather cognitivist and intellectualist, often stressinǮǯǡ
contemplative artistic experiences. (The same might be said of ǯ
of meta-goods, as he elaborates it in his book). ǯneeds to be 
extended to cover a wider range of cultural activity and forms of knowledge, drawing on 
insights from cultural studies and potentially also from other sources such as 
pragmatist aesthetics, to address how ordinary, demotic and sociable cultural practices ǯ-being in a meaningfully enriching way 
(see REDACTED for further discussion). That would require consideration, for example, 
of ǯ
flourishing. The provision of an adequate musical education and funding for musicians 
and distribution would be a vital element of policy informed by such a capabilities 
approach. Such a cultural education would need to be responsive to the way in which 
musical practices are embedded in ordinary, everyday life, and yet not strip them of 
their demotic vitality.  
 
Conclusion: Moral Economy and Critique of Markets 
Moral economy is not an exclusive or dogmatic approach. It is only one of a 
number of social theories of economic life, and fuller assessment of its relations to other 
heterodox approaches is a matter for further research on media and culture. It will not 
appeal to everyone. Crucial aspects of moral economy, such as its focus on ethics and 
the value of culture, and its objectivist notion of well-being, are ultimately incompatible 
with the subjectivism of conventional economics and the misunderstanding and 
avoidance of normativity that characterises much positivist and empiricist social 
science. Its search for more rigorous normative foundations for critique may make it 
unattractive to humanities researchers drawn to more exploratory and interpretivist 
modes of enquiry. But it has a number of potentially valuable contributions to make to 
critical social science and humanities. In the present context, the most relevant is that it 
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offers the potential to redress the normative underdevelopment of how capitalism is 
presently understood in media and cultural studies, by developing a nuanced ethics-
based critique of relations between the media and capitalism.  
To explore this potential, I have examined two fundamental concepts in which 
moral economy writers have shown great interest, and I have considered how they 
might be used in respect of communication media. Those concepts are well-being 
(based on Aristotelian conceptions of flourishing and quality of life) and capabilities Ȃ 
the latter a concept developed to ground the former, and to make it more pragmatically 
applicable to political action and to debates about public policy. Those concepts of 
course can be, and often are, used by those who would not be sympathetic to moral 
economy, and they can be used as a basis of bland, uncritical thinking. But this article 
has interpreted those concepts in a particular (Aristotelian) way, in order to specify and 
animate them, and to suggest how they might reinvigorate critique of media under 
capitalism.  
Moral economy provides a more cogent and meaningful conception of well-being 
than ones used by many defenders of capitalism and markets, and by some critics of 
them. This can help us to see that real, meaningful flourishing is not advanced by the 
expanded remit of capitalist relations (marketsǡǮǯȌ in the realm of media and culture. Moral economy thereby specifies more 
carefully than some eminent critical approaches to media-economy relations (including 
much critical theory and political economy work) the limitations of capitalism. Using the 
capabilities approach in the realm of media might help form a richer sense of the value 
of knowledge and aesthetic-artistic experience, in terms of their ability to contribute to 
human flourishing, thereby clarifying arguments and positions in political activism and 
public policy. Moral economy could enhance the capabilities approach to media and 
culture by helping to evaluate and explain factors that promote or inhibit those positive 
facets of media and culture. ǯneed not, indeed must not, preclude an interest 
in sociological variation and it should be understood as part of a more general critical 
social science. So a moral economy of culture should forge connections with the 
empirical sociology and anthropology of media. An example would be the rich emerging 
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field of cultural studies of cultural production (sic), including the Ǯǯ
movement in television studies (Mayer, Banks and Caldwell, 2009), which, though 
strong on empirical analysis of rituals and routines,currently suffers from a lack of 
attention to value, and insufficient normative grounding for its evaluations of 
production. Finally, moral economy needs to work in tandem with the best aspects of 
political economy of media, in providing a critique of power and inequality in cultural 
production. Examples would include the writings of scholars such as Edwin Baker (e.g. 
2002) and Graham Murdock (e.g. 2011), which provide evaluation of media markets in 
terms of their implications for public life and democracy but which also seek to explain 
the specific dynamics of those markets.  
There is then a very broad range of cases in which moral economy ideas might be 
mobilised in media and communication studies: from studies of how particular 
audience members find their well-being compromised or enhanced by current 
communication provision, to the question of whether social media as they are currently ǯǤObviously, the present 
article is a work of meta-theoretical development, so there has been no space to apply 
the concepts developed here to empirical cases, or to draw upon existing empirical 
work, except in brief passing examples. Studies of cultural labour have been one area in 
which efforts have been made to make links between moral-economic approaches and 
empirical work (e.g., Banks, 2007; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011). This article though 
is a piece of theory building, intended to provide ideas and concepts that might be used 
and tested in further research, by others and by the author. Moral economy is only one 
possible route for enhancing critique of media and culture. But given the severity of the 
problems concerning capitalism-media-culture relations, and the limited state of 
critique in this area, it is potentially an extremely valuable one.  
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1
 Fuchs (2011) has sought to provide foundations for critical media studies in an 
orthodox reading of Marx and Frankfurt-style critical theory but in my view he pays too ǯ, and to competing social 
theories of it. 
2
 Capitalism, and indeed its effects on quality of life, are sometimes addressed in what ǮǯǤ	
example, ustin Lewis (2013) has done an admirable job of gathering evidence about the 
consequences of unbridled capitalism on media and quality of life. But he does not seek 
to conceptualise capitalism or well-being, as a moral economy would. 
3
 The earliest widely-Ǯǯ
the eminent Marxist social historian E.P. Thompson, first published in 1971, on 
responses of the poor to food shortages in eighteenth century England. According to 
Thompson, the emergent field of political economy placed less emphasis on the social 
values underpinning economic ideas and more on instrumental notions of efficiency and Ǥǯnot actually make a substantial contribution 
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to developing the concept of moral economy in the sense that the term has come to be 
used.  
4
 Of course it is possible to use flourishing itself in a vague or apolitical way, and even in 
ways compatible with neo-liberalism. But any term can be appropriated or misused. See 
Wright (2010: 10-16, 45-50), see also Sayer (2011: 134-5) for discussion of why 
flourishing is a valuable way of understanding well-being in the context of critical,  
emancipatory social science and political struggle. 
5
 The purpose of such a list is not to close off debate, but to open it up. It is accompanied 
by an explicit invitation to amend in the light of other experiences and ways of viewing 
the world, to avoid false universalism. Problems ǯ
necessarily render the idea of specifying capabilities invalid. 
